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In this paper, we present a directed search model of the housing market. The
pricing mechanism we analyze reects the way houses are bought and sold in
the United States. Our model is consistent with the observation that houses are
sometimes sold above, sometimes below, and sometimes at the asking price. We
consider two versions of our model. In the rst version, all sellers have the same
reservation value. In the second version, there are two seller types, and type is
private information. For both versions, we characterize the equilibrium of the
game played by buyers and sellers. Our model o¤ers a new way to look at the
housing market from a search-theoretic perspective. In addition, we contribute to
the directed search literature by considering a model in which the asking price (i)
entails only limited commitment and (ii) has the potential to signal seller type.
Key Words: Directed Search, Housing
JEL codes: D83, R31
albrecht@georgetown.edu
yemail: p.a.gautier@vu.nl, +31205986038
zvromans@georgetown.edu
1
1 Introduction
In a pioneering paper, Dale Mortensen (1982) argued that search theory can  and
should be used to help understand the way that many di¤erent markets function. In
that spirit, we present a directed search model of the housing market. We construct our
model with the following stylized facts in mind. First, sellers post asking prices, and
buyers observe these announcements. Second, there is not a straightforward relationship
between the asking price and the nal sales price. Sometimes buyers make countero¤ers,
and houses sell below the asking price. Sometimes houses sell at the asking price.
Sometimes more often when the market is hot houses are sold by auction above
the asking price. This is documented by Han and Strange (2014), who use a survey by
the National Association of Realtors and nd that between 2003 and 2006, when the
housing market was booming, 13.5% of houses sold above the asking price, 29.4% sold
at the asking price, and 57.1% sold below the asking price. During the "housing bust"
period from 2007 to 2010, 8.2% sold above the asking price, 17.5% sold at the asking
price, and 74.3% sold below the asking price.1 Third, a seller who posts a low asking
price is more likely to sell his or her house, albeit at a lower price, than one who posts
a higher asking price.2
Our model is one of directed search in the sense that sellers use the asking price to
attract buyers. However, ours is not a standard directed search model in that we assume
only limited commitment to the asking price.3 The specic form of commitment to the
asking price that we assume reects the institutions of the U.S. housing market. Within
a selling period,buyers who view a house that is listed at a particular price can make
o¤ers on that house.4 A seller is free to reject any o¤er below the asking price, but
also has the option to accept such an o¤er. However, if one or more bona de o¤ers to
buy the house at the asking price (without contingencies) are received, then the seller is
1Case and Shiller (2003) conduct a survey in four cities, Boston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and San
Francisco, and nd that on average in 1988, 4.9% of houses sold above the asking price, 27.9% sold at
the asking price, and 67.1% sold below the asking price. For 2003, the gures were 25.5% above the
asking price, 48.4% at the asking price, and 29.1% below the asking price. Data from the Netherlands
(see, e.g., De Wit and Van der Klaauw 2013 for a description of the data) are also consistent with our
stylized facts.
2Ortalo-Magné and Merlo (2004), using UK data, nd that a lower asking price increases the number
of visitors and o¤ers that a seller can expect to receive but decreases the expected sales price. Similarly,
using Dutch data, De Wit and Van der Klaauw (2013) show that list price reductions signicantly
increase the probability of selling a house.
3While we assume limited commitment to the asking price, we do assume full commitment to the
selling mechanism, which will be discussed below.
4We assume that each buyer can bid on at most one house within a selling period, but a seller
may receive multiple bids. Our urn-ball meeting technology is many-on-oneor what Eeckhout and
Kircher (2010) call nonrival.The urn-ball meeting technology is also what Lester et al. (2015) call
invariant.
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committed to sell.5 If only one such o¤er at the asking price is received, then the seller
is committed to transfer the house to the buyer at that price. If the seller receives two
or more legitimate o¤ers at the asking price, then, of course, the house cannot be sold to
more than one buyer. In this case, the buyers who bid the asking price can bid against
each other to buy the house. In practice, in some locations, this auction takes the form
of bids with escalator clauses. For example, if a house is listed at $1 million, a buyer
might submit a bid of that amount together with an o¤er to beat any other o¤er the
seller might receive by $5,000 up to a maximum of $1.1 million.
Given limited commitment, what determines the asking prices that sellers post and
what role do these asking prices play? Of course, the asking price for a spacious house
that is located in a desirable neighborhood is typically higher than the asking price for
a smaller house in a less desirable neighborhood. We assume that prospective buyers
can observe these and more subtle verticaldi¤erences among houses, either directly or
with the help of real estate agents. Instead, we focus on the role that asking prices play
in directing search across houses that buyers view as ex ante identical. In particular,
we are interested in the question of whether asking prices can direct buyers towards
motivated sellers, that is, those who are particularly eager to sell and are therefore
more likely to accept a low countero¤er.
We begin, however, with a basic version of our model in which all sellers are equally
motivated, i.e., have the same reservation value. This homogeneous-seller version of our
model serves as a foundation for the heterogeneous-seller version but is also of interest
in its own right. After observing all the asking prices in the market, each buyer visits a
set of sellers. Upon visiting a seller, the buyer discovers how much he or she likes the
house; that is, the buyer observes the realization of a match-specic random variable.
This realization is the buyers private information and we assume that observing it is
costless.6 Based on these realizations and without knowing how many other buyers
have visited these sellers  the buyer chooses a house to bid on and decides between
accepting the sellers asking price and making a countero¤er (and, if so, at what level).
The seller then assembles the o¤ers, if any. If no buyer has o¤ered to pay the asking
price, the seller decides whether or not to accept the best countero¤er. If one, and only
5This commitment is often written into contracts between sellers and their real estate agents in the
form of a clause requiring the seller to reimburse the agents fee if a bona de o¤er is rejected.
6Lester et al. (2013) consider a directed search model in which there is a cost to observe the match-
specic value. In their model, buyers sequentially pay this cost and observe their valuations. The selling
process terminates when a buyer accepts the asking price, or, if no buyer accepts the asking price, the
seller sells to the buyer with the highest bid if that bid exceeds the sellers reservation value. Our
assumption that it is costless to observe the match-specic value reects our view that in the housing
market, once a buyer visits a house the cost of observing the valuation is minor, although the cost of
inspection (usually done after a contract is reached) can be high.
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one, o¤er at the asking price has been received, then the house is sold at that price.
If multiple o¤ers at the asking price have been received, the buyers who made those
o¤ers are allowed to compete for the house via an ascending bid auction.7 A payo¤-
equivalence result holds for this version of the model. All asking prices at or above the
sellers reservation value give the seller the same expected payo¤; asking prices below
the reservation value yield a lower expected payo¤. Similarly, buyers are indi¤erent
with respect to any asking price greater than or equal to the common reservation value
but strictly prefer any asking price below that level. Any distribution of asking prices
greater than or equal to the common seller reservation value constitutes an equilibrium,
and there are no equilibria in which any sellers post asking prices below the common
reservation value. These equilibria are constrained e¢ cient in the sense that, given the
level of market tightness, the house always goes to the buyer who values it most if
that value is above the sellers reservation value or, if not, it is retained by the seller.
In addition, when market tightness is endogenous, equilibrium entails the optimal seller
entry. These e¢ ciency results follow from the payo¤equivalence between the mechanism
we consider and a second-price auction with a competitively determined reserve price.8
After analyzing the homogeneous-seller case, we consider a version of our model in
which sellers have di¤erent reservation values and in which these reservation values are
private information. Specically, we examine a model in which there are two seller types
one group with a high reservation value (relaxed sellers), the other with a low reser-
vation value (motivated sellers). In this heterogeneous-seller version of our model, the
asking price can potentially signal a sellers type. In our signaling model, sellers have
both ex ante and ex post signaling motives. Ex ante a seller wants to signal a low reser-
vation value. This attracts buyers since buyers prefer to visit a seller who is perceived
to be weak.Ex post, however, that is, once any buyers have visited, a seller prefers to
have signaled a high reservation value. Buyers will make higher bids when dealing with
a seller who is perceived to be strong.Using a standard renement on buyersout-of-
equilibrium beliefs, we show the nonexistence of pooling and hybrid equilibria. We then
prove the existence of separating equilibria in which the two seller types are identied
by their posted asking prices. These separating equilibria are constrained e¢ cient in
the sense that the level of entry by sellers is optimal and the equilibrium allocation of
buyer visits across the two seller types is the same as the allocation that a social planner
7In a tight market, we sometimes observe buyers submitting initial bids above the asking price. We
assume that sellers are committed to allowing all buyers who bid at least the asking price to participate
in the auction, so it is not in any buyers interest to make an initial bid above the asking price. Buyers
do, however, make bids above the asking price in the subsequent auction.
8In Albrecht et al. (2014), we prove e¢ cient seller entry in a competing auction model in which
sellers post second-price auctions. Here we extend the result to a market in which asking prices may
exceed the sellers reservation value and countero¤ers below the asking price are possible.
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would choose.9
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that uses an equilibrium search
approach to understand the housing market. Search theory is a natural tool to use to
analyze this market since it clearly takes time and e¤ort for buyers to nd suitable sellers
and vice versa. Most of the papers in this literature assume that search is random.
In some of these papers, when a buyer and seller meet, one of the parties (typically
the seller) makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er; in others, prices are determined by Nash
bargaining. See, for example, Wheaton (1990) and Albrecht et al. (2007). In contrast, in
our model, search is directed; that is, sellers post prices to attract buyers. Other models
of the housing market that take a directed search approach include Díaz and Jerez (2013),
Carrillo (2012), and Stacey (2013). Díaz and Jerez (2013) analyze the problem initially
posed in Wheaton (1990), in which shocks lead to mismatch, causing a household to rst
search to buy a new house and then to look for a buyer for its old house. In equilibrium,
all sellers post the same asking price, the asking price and the sales price are the same,
and all houses sell with the same probability. In Carrillo (2012), buyers also direct their
search in response to posted asking prices, but sellers interact with only one buyer at
a time. In his model, the asking price is a price ceiling sometimes the seller gets the
asking price, but sometimes the buyer gets the house at the sellers reservation value.
Houses never sell above their asking prices because, by assumption, there is never any ex
post competition among buyers. Relative to these models, our model yields prices that
may be above the asking price, which is consistent with the empirical ndings. Finally,
Stacey (2013) is the paper that is closest to ours. Using our model as a starting point,
albeit with a two-point distribution for the idiosyncratic value that a buyer realizes once
he or she visits a seller, he explores the implications of eliminating any commitment to
the asking price. In the heterogeneous-seller version of our model, sellers signal their
type by their (limited) commitment to the asking prices they announce, whereas in his
model, also with two seller types, sellers signal whether they are motivated or not by the
type of real estate contract they sign (high-service/high-fee versus low-service/low-fee).
We also contribute to the directed search literature. In the standard directed search
model, there is full commitment in the sense that all transactions must take place at
the posted price. In our model, however, there is only limited commitment. The posted
price means somethingand is used to attract buyers, but the nal selling price need
not be the same as the posted price. Camera and Selcuk (2009) also consider a model
of directed search with limited commitment to the asking price. As we do, they assume
that sellers post prices and that buyers direct their search in response to those postings.
The di¤erence between our approach and theirs comes once each buyer chooses a seller.
9These e¢ ciency results follow directly from Albrecht et al. (2014).
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They allow for the possibility that the nal selling price and the posted price di¤er, but
they are agnostic about the specics of how this occurs. Our approach di¤ers from theirs
in that we assume a specic price determination mechanism. We take this more specic
approach because the price determination mechanism that we analyze is an important
one in practice.
We also add to the directed search literature by considering the potential signaling
role of the asking price. There are a number of papers that incorporate private informa-
tion into a directed search model, but most of these assume that the private information
is not on the side of the price setters. See, for example, Guerrieri et al. (2010). Delacroix
and Shi (2013) is an exception that does have private information on the side of the price
setters as we do. They consider a model in which the asking price plays the dual role
of directing buyer search and potentially signaling seller type. In their model, sellers
choose a price and whether to produce a low-quality or high-quality good. Buyers direct
their search based on the observed price and then, after matching, observe a signal of
quality. The nature of the equilibrium depends on the quality di¤erential. Their model
di¤ers in several dimensions from ours. First, seller type in our model is motivation
while in their model it is quality of the good. Thus, there is a common value component
to the value of the match in their model. Second, they assume full commitment to the
price. Finally, they assume bilateral or rival matching.
Finally, our model is related to the papers of Menzio (2007) and Kim and Kircher
(2013), which consider the possibility of cheap-talk equilibria in a directed search en-
vironment. In the heterogeneous-seller version of our model, it is also natural to ask
whether cheap talk might be enough to separate the two seller types. That is, is it
enough for sellers to post advertisements announcing their types without commitment
of any sort to the asking price? In our setup, the answer is norelaxed sellers would
want to mimic their more motivated counterparts.
In constructing our model, we have abstracted from some important features of the
housing market. One obvious abstraction is that we ignore real estate agents. We do this
to keep our model simple but also because the decision about the asking price, which
is the focus of our model, is ultimately the sellers to make. We also abstract from the
fact that in the housing market, buyers are often also sellers and their ability to buy
may hinge on their ability to sell. Rather than modeling this explicitly as in Wheaton
(1990) and Díaz and Jerez (2013), we capture this in the heterogeneous-seller version of
our model through the reservation value. A motivated seller, one with a low reservation
value, can be thought of as one who has already bought or put a contract on a new
house and is thus eager to sell.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay
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out the structure of the game that we analyze. In Section 3, we analyze the model
assuming that all sellers have the same reservation value. In Section 4, we consider the
heterogeneous-seller case. We show the nonexistence of pooling and hybrid equilibria
and the existence of separating equilibrium. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
2 Basic Model
We model the housing market as a one-shot game played by B buyers and S sellers of
identical houses. We consider a large market in which both B and S go to innity but
in such a way as to keep  = B=S; the market tightness, constant. We rst analyze the
market taking  as given. Then, once equilibrium is characterized for any given ; we
allow for free entry of sellers and discuss the e¢ ciency of market equilibrium.
The game has several stages:
1. Each seller posts an asking price a.
2. Each buyer observes all posted prices and chooses k houses to visit. There is
no coordination among the buyers. Upon visiting a house, the buyer draws a
match-specic value: Match-specic values are private information and are iid
draws across buyer-seller pairs. The buyer can bid on at most one house and
chooses the house with the highest match-specic value, which we denote by x:
We assume that x has a continuous distribution, F (x); with support [0; 1]: This
distribution is assumed to have an increasing hazard. Buyers do not observe the
number of other visitors to a house.
3. At the chosen house, the buyer can accept the asking price, a; or make a coun-
tero¤er.10
4. If no buyer visits, the seller retains the value of the house.
5. If at least one buyer visits, but no buyer accepts the asking price, then the seller
can accept or reject the highest countero¤er. If one or more buyers accept the
asking price, then there is an ascending-bid (second-price) auction with reserve
price a among those buyers. In this case, the house is transferred to the highest
bidder.
A buyer who fails to purchase a house receives a payo¤ of zero. The payo¤ for a buyer
who draws x and then purchases the house is x  p; where p is the price that the buyer
10If x < s; we view the buyer as making a countero¤er of zero. Equivalently, the buyer makes no bid.
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pays. If no sale is made, the owner of the house retains its value, while a seller who
transfers a house to a buyer at price p receives that price as payo¤.
This is a model of directed search in the sense that buyers observe all asking prices
and choose which house to bid on based on these asking prices. It di¤ers from many
directed search models in that the sellers make a limited commitment to their asking
prices. If only one buyer shows up and accepts the asking price, then the seller agrees
to sell at that price, but if more buyers accept the asking price, then the price is bid
up. We consider symmetric equilibria in which all buyers use the same strategy. They
search optimally given the distribution of posted asking prices and given optimal directed
search by other buyers. Buyers bid optimally given the bidding strategy followed by other
buyers.
We rst consider the case of homogeneous sellers, i.e., the case in which all sellers
have the same reservation value s: In setting an asking price, each seller anticipates the
reactions of buyers to the posted price given the distribution of asking prices posted by
other sellers. When sellers are homogenous, we show that the only role of the asking
price is to ensure that houses do not sell below s: After considering the homogeneous
case, we turn to the heterogeneous case in which sellers di¤er with respect to their
reservation values and seller type is private information. In this case, the asking price
can potentially signal seller type. We assume that there are two seller types: high
types who have reservation value s and low types who have a reservation value that we
normalize to zero.
3 Homogeneous Sellers
We begin by considering the case in which all sellers have the same reservation value, s:
We rst show a payo¤ equivalence result for asking prices of s or more. We next show
that any distribution of asking prices on a  s is an equilibrium. We do this by showing
that, in equilibrium, no seller wants to post an asking price below s:
3.1 Payo¤ Equivalence
Consider a seller posting a  s. If a = s; the seller is posting a second-price auction with
reserve price s. If a > s; some buyers may choose to make countero¤ers between s and a;
while buyers who draw higher valuations may accept the asking price. The buyers who
choose to make countero¤ers are essentially engaging in a sealed-bid rst-price auction
(relevant only if no buyers accept a) while any who accept a are participating in a
second-price auction.
Our payo¤equivalence result follows from standard auction theory, although we need
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to account for the fact that the number of buyers is random. First, consider the case in
which the number of buyers visiting a particular seller is given. A statement of revenue
equivalence is given in Proposition 3.1 of Krishna (2010):
Suppose that values are independently and identically distributed and all
buyers are risk neutral. Then any symmetric and increasing equilibrium of
any standard auction, such that the expected payment of a bidder with value
zero is zero, yields the same expected revenue to the seller.
The selling mechanism that we consider is a standard auction since the mechanism
dictates that the buyer who makes the highest bid of s or more (the highest countero¤er
if no buyer accepts a; the highest bid in the second-price auction if one or more buyers
accepts a) gets the house. The equilibrium is increasing since buyer bids are increasing
in x: Finally, a buyer who draws x  s gets value zero from this selling mechanism and
pays nothing.
We also have payo¤ equivalence for buyers across all asking prices of s or more. The
surplus associated with a particular house is the maximum of the sellers reservation
value and the highest value drawn by a buyer. Any surplus that doesnt go to the
seller necessarily goes to the winning bidder (and any losing bidders get zero). Revenue
equivalence for sellers thus implies payo¤ equivalence for buyers, so buyers are equally
willing to visit any seller posting an asking price of a  s:
Payo¤equivalence for buyers and sellers continues to hold when the number of buyers
is a random draw from a nite number of potential bidders (McAfee and McMillan 1987,
Harstad, Kagel and Levin 1990). In our directed search setting, the expected queue
length across all sellers o¤ering the same expected payo¤, i.e., across all sellers posting
a  s; must be equal. In a large market, this means that the number of buyers visiting
a particular seller is a Poisson random variable, a random draw from a distribution with
unbounded support. The same argument used to show revenue and payo¤ equivalence
when the set of potential buyers is nite can be used to show that it holds in this case
as well.11
3.2 Equilibrium
We have shown that buyers and sellers are indi¤erent across all asking prices a  s:
To show that any distribution of asking prices over a  s constitutes an equilibrium,
11With a random number of buyers, an individual buyers optimal bid is a weighted average of
his optimal bids conditional on competing with n = 0; 1; 2; ::: other buyers; specically, b(x) =P
pnF (x)
nb(x;n)P
pnF (x)n
; where pn is the probability the buyer is competing with n other buyers and b(x;n)
is the optimal bid at x when facing n other buyers. The only issue with a potentially innite number
of bidders is the convergence of the weighted average. With Poisson weights, convergence is assured.
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we must show that no seller would choose to post an asking price below s: If a seller
were to post an asking price a < s; the expected arrival rate of buyers would be greater
than it would have been had that seller posted a  s; but the seller would expect to
receive lower bids. Note that a seller who posts a < s is in e¤ect o¤ering a second-price
auction with reserve price a: The reason is that buyers know that there is never any
point to making a countero¤er since countero¤ers would always be rejected. The sellers
problem of choosing an optimal reserve price in a second-price auction can be posed as a
constrained maximization problem. The seller advertises a reserve price, a; to maximize
the expected payo¤subject to the constraint that a buyer who visits the seller can expect
to receive at least as high a payo¤ as is available elsewhere in the market. The rate at
which buyers visit this seller, ; adjusts so that the value of visiting this particular seller
is the same as that of visiting any of the other sellers. The constrained maximization
problem can thus be written as12
max (a; ) subject to V (a; ) = V ; (1)
where a is the reserve price,  is the Poisson arrival rate of buyers, and V is the market
level of buyer utility. The seller and buyer payo¤s are () and V (); respectively, with
(a; ) = s+ 
Z 1
a
(v(x)  s)e (1 F (x))f(x)dx
= s+ (1  e )
Z 1
a
(v(x)  s)g(x)dx
V (a; ) =
Z 1
a
(x  v(x))e (1 F (x))f(x)dx
=
Z 1
a
(1  F (x))e (1 F (x))dx;
where
v(x) = x  1  F (x)
f(x)
is the virtual valuation function,which can be interpreted as the marginal revenue
associated with a buyer of type x (Bulow and Roberts 1989), and
g(x) =
e (1 F (x))f(x)
1  e 
is the density of the highest valuation drawn by the buyers visiting a particular seller
conditional on the seller having at least one visitor.13 As is standard, v(x) is increasing
12This formulation of the problem follows Peters and Severinov (1997).
13The derivation of g(x) is as follows. Let H denote the event that a particular buyer draws the
highest valuation. Using Bayes Law,
f(xjH)  g(x) = P (Hjx)f(x)
P (H)
:
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in x: This follows from our assumption that F has an increasing hazard. The expected
seller payo¤ is s plus the probability that at least one buyer visits the seller times the
integral of v(x) s against the density of the highest valuation. Finally, the buyer payo¤,
V (a; ); is x  v(x) times the probability that no other buyer draws a value greater than
x integrated against the density of x:
Lemma 1 The asking price that solves the constrained maximization problem (1) is
a = s: The corresponding Poisson arrival rate is the solution to V (s; ) = V :
The proof is analogous to the one given in Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2012),
which deals with the case of s = 0.14 Lemma 1 implies that no sellers post asking prices
below s; and since all asking prices a  s are payo¤equivalent, any distribution of asking
prices over a  s is an equilibrium.
Summarizing,
Proposition 1 Any distribution of asking prices over a  s constitutes an equilibrium
of the homogeneous-seller model. All such equilibria are payo¤ equivalent. Further, there
are no equilibria in which any sellers post asking prices below s:
Note that although we have presented our results in the context of a one-shot game,
the same results would obtain in a steady-state framework.15
Proposition 1 states that there is an innity of equilibria in the homogeneous-seller
model, but we have shown that all of these equilibria are payo¤ equivalent. We can
thus choose one of these equilibria, for example, the one in which all sellers post a = s;
to demonstrate some of the properties of equilibrium. In particular, we now show that
The probability that a buyer who has drawn x has the highest valuation is
P [Hjx] = e (1 F (x)):
The unconditional probability that any one buyer has the highest valuation is
P [H] =
Z 1
0
e (1 F (x))f(x)dx =
1  e 

:
14Extending the proof to the case of s  0 is straightforward and is available from the authors upon
request. The lemma generalizes results in Julien et al.(2000) and in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010). In
di¤erent contexts, they show that if all buyers have the same valuation (not less than the common
seller reservation value), then the equilibrium reserve price in a competing auctions game is the seller
reservation value.
15A steady-state version of the model can be derived using the methodology in Wolinsky (1988).
He considers a market in steady state in which sellers are assumed to post rst-price auctions with
a minimum price and in which the number of buyers per seller is assumed to be a Poisson random
variable. Given revenue equivalence, the results presented in Wolinsky (1988) apply directly to our
second-price auction setting.
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the probability of sale and the average selling price vary with  and s; the exogenous
parameters of the model, in the expected way.
Consider rst the probability that any particular house is sold. This is
P [Sale] = 1  e (1 F (s)):
As expected, as the market gets tighter, i.e., as  increases, the probability that a house
sells increases. Equivalently, if we were to recast our model in a steady-state framework,
as  increases, expected time on the market decreases. In addition, also as expected, as
sellers become less motivated, i.e., as s increases, the probability of a sale decreases
(equivalently, expected time on the market increases).
Next, conditional on a sale, the expected price is
E[P ] =
R 1
s
v(x)g(x)dxR 1
s
g(x)dx
:
Since neither v(x) nor g(x) depend on s;
@E[P ]
@s
=
 v(s)g(s) R 1
s
g(x)dx+ g(s)
R 1
s
v(x)g(x)dxR 1
s
g(x)dx
2
=
g(s)
R 1
s
(v(x)  v(s))g(x)dxR 1
s
g(x)dx
2 > 0;
where the inequality follows from our assumption that v(x) is increasing. As sellers
become less motivated, fewer houses are sold, but those that do sell are sold at a higher
price on average.
Finally, to examine how the expected price varies with ; write
E[P ] =
Z 1
s
v(x)h(x; )dx;
where
h(x; ) =
g(x; )R 1
s
g(x; )dx
:
Note that H(x; ) =
R x
s
h(t; )dt satises rst-order stochastic dominance with respect
to ; that is, 0 >  implies H(x; 0) < H(x; ) for all x 2 (s; 1):16 Now, write
v(x) = v(s) +
Z x
s
v0(t)dt;
16We thank Xiaoming Cai for suggesting this argument. The intuition is that as the number of
visitors a seller can expect increases, the distribution of the highest valuation drawn among those
visitors becomes more favorable from the sellers point of view. The algebra required to verify this
formally is a bit tedious but is available on request.
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so
E[P ] = v(s) +
Z 1
s
h(x; )
Z x
s
v0(t)dtdx
= v(s) +
Z 1
s
v0(t)
Z 1
t
h(x; )dxdt
= v(s) +
Z 1
s
v0(t)(1 H(t; ))dt:
Finally, since v0(t) > 0 (by assumption) and
@(1 H(t; ))
@
> 0 (by rst-order stochastic
dominance with respect to ); we have
@E[P ]
@
> 0:
It is clear that in the model with homogeneous sellers, the mechanism that we analyze
is e¢ cient in the sense that once buyers match with sellers, no mutually protable
transactions are left unconsummated. Further, if more than one buyer draws a valuation
above the sellers reservation value, the house is necessarily sold to the buyer with the
highest valuation. The only remaining e¢ ciency question is whether, once we allow for
free entry on the seller side of the market, the buyer/seller ratio is constrained e¢ cient.
In Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2014), we prove that in a large market in which
sellers compete by posting reserve prices for second-price auctions, the free-entry equilib-
rium level of seller entry is constrained e¢ cient. The mechanism that we consider here is
equivalent to a second-price auction in the sense that, given any level of market tightness,
expected buyer and seller payo¤s are the same in the innity of payo¤-equivalent equi-
libria of our model as they would be if sellers were to compete by posting reserve prices
for second-price auctions (in which case, as we argued above, they would all post s). In
particular, sellers have the same incentive to enter as they would if houses were sold by
second-price auctions. We can therefore apply the e¢ ciency result from Albrecht, Gau-
tier, and Vroman (2014) to conclude that free-entry equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient
in the homogeneous-seller case.
4 Heterogeneous Sellers
When all sellers have the same reservation value, the only role that asking prices play
is to ensure that houses never sell below that common value. Why then do buyers care
about asking prices? An important reason, in our view, is that, across identical houses,
the asking price signals a sellers type, that is, how eager the seller is to sell his or her
house. We now develop this idea in the heterogeneous-seller version of our model.
We suppose that sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their reservation values.
For simplicity, we consider two seller types. A fraction q of the sellers, the high (H) types
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(relaxed sellers), have reservation value s; as in the homogeneous case. The remaining
sellers, the low (L) types (motivated sellers), have a lower reservation value, which
we normalize to 0: Seller type is private information, but q is common knowledge. The
model with heterogeneous sellers is a signaling game, so we consider Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria. A sellers strategy is a choice of an asking price and, in case no buyer accepts
the asking price, a reaction (accept or reject) to the highest countero¤er received, if any.
A buyers strategy is a choice of which seller to visit or a distribution of probability
across all sellers together with a choice of whether to make a countero¤er (and, if so, at
what level) or to accept the sellers asking price once x is observed. Buyers form beliefs
about sellerstypes based on their asking prices. As in the homogeneous-seller case, we
only consider symmetric equilibria in which all buyers use the same strategy.
There are three types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria to consider in which sellers
follow pure strategies. In a separating equilibrium, each seller posts an asking price that
is type-revealing. There are also two types of pooling equilibria to consider one in
which type-H sellers mimic type-L sellers by posting asking prices below s (pooling-
on-low) and one in which type-L sellers mimic type-H sellers by posting asking prices
of s or more (pooling-on-high). Finally, hybrid equilibria, in which one seller type
randomizes between a high price and a low price, also need to be considered. In a
mixing-by-lowsequilibrium, type-L sellers randomize between posting a low price and
a high price, while type-H sellers all post a high price, and in a mixing-by-highs
equilibrium, type-H sellers randomize between posting a low versus a high price, while
all type-L sellers post a low price.
The asking price has the potential to signal seller type, but the incentives for one
type to mimic the other are not straightforward in our model. Ex ante sellers want
buyers to believe that they are type L because this increases the expected queue length,
but ex post, once buyers have allocated themselves across sellers, sellers want buyers to
believe that they are type H because this belief leads to higher bids on average. Sellers,
however, have only one signal and must trade o¤ the benet of longer queues in the
rst stage against higher bids in the second stage. This is why the two types of pooling
equilibria and the two types of hybrid equilibria are conceivable in our setting.
Despite the incentives to mimic, we show that neither pooling equilibria nor hybrid
equilibria exist in our model under a standard renement on buyersbeliefs. The equi-
libria that do exist separate the two seller types. Type-L sellers post low prices, and
type-H sellers post high prices of s or more, and there is a separating equilibrium for
each parameter combination, fq; s; g: More precisely, similar to the homogeneous-seller
case, there is an innity of payo¤-equivalent equilibria for each parameter conguration.
Other separating equilibria in which type-H sellers post higher asking prices than type-L
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sellers do but in which the higher asking prices are less than s are also conceivable, but
we can rule out this possibility using the same renement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs
used to rule out pooling and hybrid equilibria.
Separating equilibria are e¢ cient in three senses. First, once buyers have allocated
themselves across sellers, sales are consummated if and only if the net surplus from doing
so is positive, and when a house is sold it always goes to the buyer with the highest
valuation. Second, a social planner would prefer that type-L sellers have longer queues
on average than do type-H sellers. Separating equilibrium gets these queue lengths just
right. Finally, seller entry is constrained e¢ cient.
We now give the details of these arguments.
4.1 Nonexistence of Pooling or Hybrid Equilibria
We begin by showing the nonexistence of pooling and hybrid equilibria. In a pooling
equilibrium, all sellers post the same asking price. There are two cases to consider. First,
all sellers could post a high asking price, e.g., a = s: Second, they could all post a low
asking price, e.g., a = 0: We refer to the two cases as pooling on highand pooling
on lowand analyze them in turn.
Consider rst a candidate pooling-on-high equilibrium; e.g., suppose all sellers post
a = s:17 Buyers know that a seller posting s is type H with probability q and type L with
probability 1 q: A buyer who draws a low enough value of x makes a countero¤er below
s; which only type-L sellers accept, while a buyer who draws a higher value of x may
prefer to accept s:18 If one or more buyers accepts s; then a second-price auction with
reserve price s, limited to those buyers who accepted s; follows. Consider a potential
deviation by a type-L seller to a = 0: Such a deviation has both a benet and a cost.
The benet is that the expected arrival rate of buyers increases, which has a positive
e¤ect on the sellers expected payo¤, while the cost is that in some circumstances the
nal price is less than it would have been had the seller posted a = s:19 At the candidate
equilibrium, the expected arrival rate is : The deviants expected arrival rate, ; is
determined by the buyer indi¤erence condition.
V (s; ; q) = V (0; ): (2)
17We thank Yosuke Yasuda for helpful comments on this case.
18The reason for the conditional language (may prefer) is that if s is su¢ ciently close to one and/or
q is su¢ ciently close to zero, buyers prefer making countero¤ers to accepting s for all x 2 [0; 1]:
19When all sellers post a = s; there is a value ex such that buyers who draw x < ex make a bid that only
type-L sellers would accept, i.e., a bid below s: (The buyer who draws ex must be indi¤erent between
bidding s and making a countero¤er that only a type-L seller would accept.) The cost of deviating
arises when there is only one buyer who draws an x  ex: In this case, when the seller posts s; the
sellers payo¤ is s. Were the seller to post 0; the expected payo¤ would be the expected maximum of
any draws below ex; which must be less than s by the denition of ex:
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Here V (s; ; q) denotes the expected payo¤ for a buyer bidding on a house with asking
price s and expected arrival rate  given that the buyer believes that the seller is type H
with probability q; and V (0; ) is the corresponding expected payo¤ for a buyer bidding
on the house with asking price 0 and expected arrival rate . Note that the latter
expression doesnt depend on q since the buyer does not care about the sellers type
when the asking price is 0.
We want to prove that it is in the interest of a type-L seller to deviate to a = 0:Denote
the expected payo¤ for a type-L seller who posts s when all other sellers are posting s by
L(s; ; q) and the corresponding expected payo¤ for a deviation to a = 0 by L(0; ):
We want to prove that L(0; ) > L(s; ; q) 8(s; q) 2 (0; 1]2. At s = 0; there is trivially
no di¤erence between deviating and not deviating, so  = ; and L(0; ) = L(0; ; q):
Thus, what we need to show is that starting at s = 0; increasing s raises the sellers
value of deviating, L(0; ); more than it raises the value of setting a = s: That is, we
want to show that
@L(0; )
@s
>
@L(s; ; q)
@s
8q 2 (0; 1]: (3)
An increase in s a¤ects L(0; ) indirectly by increasing ; that is,
@L(0; )
@s
=
@L(0; )
@
@
@s
: (4)
From the market utility condition, i.e., equation (2), we have
@
@s
=
@V (s; ; q)=@s
@V (0; )=@
: (5)
since neither  nor q are a¤ected by a change in s:Whether the type-L seller posts a = s
or a = 0; the selling mechanism is e¢ cient in the sense that the total surplus generated is
distributed between the buyer and seller with no surplus left on the table.In particular,
when a = s; the total surplus, 1  R 1
0
e (1 F (x))dx;20 is divided between the seller with
expected payo¤ L(s; ; q) and the buyers with expected payo¤ of V (s; ; q): That is,
1 
Z 1
0
e (1 F (x))dx = L(s; ; q) + V (s; ; q):
20The total surplus associated with the mechanism is the expected value of the highest valuation drawn
among the buyers who visit this seller. Suppose n buyers visit. Conditional on n; this expectation is
Emax[X1; :::; Xn] =
Z 1
0
xdF (x)n = 1 
Z 1
0
F (x)ndx:
The number of buyers visiting this seller is Poisson with parameter ; so the total surplus is
1X
n=0
e n
n!

1 
Z 1
0
F (x)ndx

= 1 
Z 1
0
e (1 F (x))dx:
16
In turn, since the LHS does not vary with s; this implies
@V (s; ; q)
@s
=  

1


@L(s; ; q)
@s
: (6)
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into (4), gives
@L(0; )
@s
=  

@L(0; )
@

1


@L(s; ; q)=@s
@V (0; )=@

;
and inequality (3) becomes
 

@L(0; )
@

=

@V (0; )
@

> : (7)
To verify this nal inequality, we use a result from Albrecht et al. (2012), namely,
@L(0; )
@
+ 
@V (0; )
@
= 0; 21
so inequality (7) reduces to  > ; which is true for all q 2 (0; 1]: QED
It is worth noting that buyer beliefs about what a deviation to an asking price of
zero might signal about the deviants type play no role in the argument. A buyer who
visits a seller posting a = 0 doesnt care about the sellers type. The buyers optimal
bid, namely, accept a = 0; is the same regardless of the sellers type, as is the expected
payo¤. Pooling on any other a > s can also be ruled out as an equilibrium by the same
argument. Similarly, hybrid equilibria in which all type-H sellers post an asking price
above s and the type-L sellers mix between that asking price and zero are also ruled out.
We do, however, use a restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to prove the nonexis-
tence of pooling-on-low and mixing-by-highs equilibria. To understand the equilibrium
renement that we use, suppose all sellers post a = 0: According to the Intuitive Cri-
terion (Cho and Kreps 1987), buyers should believe that a deviation to a = s signals
type H with probability one if (i) the deviation is strictly protable for a type-H seller
conditional on buyers believing that the deviation signals type H with probability one
and (ii) the deviation is strictly unprotable for a type-L seller for any beliefs that buy-
ers might hold about the deviants type. Let  be the probability that buyers attach
to type H given a deviation to a = s: By Lemma 1, a deviation from a = 0 to a = s
is strictly protable for type H if  = 1; and by a proof similar to the one we used
to rule out pooling-on-high or mixing-by-lows equilibria, the same deviation is strictly
21The intuition for this result is that when a new buyer visits a seller, the surplus at that seller is
increased. The seller is better o¤, the extant buyers are worse o¤, and there is an expected benet to
the new buyer. As the equation indicates, the e¤ects on the seller and on the extant buyers just balance
out.
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unprotable for a type L so long as  > 0: If  = 0; however, the type-L seller would
neither gain nor lose by deviating to a = s. All asking prices are revenue equivalent
for this type so long as buyers continue to believe that the sellers reservation value is
zero with probability one. The Intuitive Criterion is thus not strong enough to rule out
the candidate pooling-on-low equilibrium. Instead, we appeal to the D1 renement
(Banks and Sobel 1987; see also Fudenberg and Tirole 1992, p. 452). Renement D1
requires buyers to set  = 1 if the set of beliefs that make type L sellers willing to
deviate to a = s is a strict subset of the set of beliefs that make type H sellers willing
to deviate to a = s: We have already argued that type L is willing to deviate to a = s
only if  = 0 and that type H is willing to deviate to a = s if  = 1: To show that the
condition required for D1 holds, it thus su¢ ces to show that type H is also willing to
deviate to a = s when  = 0: Suppose then that a type-H seller deviates from a = 0 to
a = s but that buyers view the deviation as a probability-one signal that the deviant is
type L; i.e., buyers set  = 0: The expected arrival rate of buyers to the deviant is the
same as would have been realized had the seller continued to post a = 0: Some buyers
who visit the deviant will make countero¤ers below s; others may accept s: If the type-H
deviant always accepted the highest bid received, i.e., the highest countero¤er when no
buyer accepts s; then, by revenue equivalence, the expected payo¤would be the same as
it would have been had the deviant continued to post a = 0: However, the deviant has
the option to reject countero¤ers below s; and it is in the sellers interest to do so. In
short, if  = 0; a type-H seller benets by deviating to a = s because (i) the expected
number of buyers visiting does not change and (ii) the seller can reject bids below s.
Finally, if all sellers post a = 0; and if buyers believe that a deviation to a = s
signals type H with probability one, then again, by Lemma 1, it is in the interest of
the type-H seller to deviate. Pooling-on-low equilibria are ruled out by this reasoning,
and a similar argument gives the nonexistence of a hybrid equilibrium in which type-H
sellers mix between a low price and a high price. We have used a = 0 as a convenient
example of a candidate pooling-on-low equilibrium, but we can also rule out pooling
on other asking prices below s: In particular, if all sellers post a 2 (0; s); then, by the
same argument that we used to rule out pooling-on-high equilibria, type-L sellers want
to deviate to an asking price of zero.
Summarizing, we have shown:
Proposition 2 Neither pooling-on-high nor mixing-by-lows equilibria exist in the heterogeneous-
seller version of the model. In addition, under the D1 renement, neither pooling-on-low
nor mixing-by-highs equilibria exist.
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4.2 Separating Equilibria
A natural separating equilibrium to consider is one in which all type-L sellers post a = 0,
all type-H sellers post a = s; and in which buyers believe that a = 0 signals type L with
probability 1 while a = s signals type H with probability 1. This conguration satises
an obvious e¢ ciency criterion, namely, that a house is sold if and only if the highest
buyer valuation is greater than or equal to the sellers reservation value.
To prove the existence of this type of equilibrium, note rst that, given buyer beliefs,
a type-H seller strictly prefers posting the high asking price to the low one: This follows
directly from Lemma 1 since, given the hypothesized buyer beliefs, the choice between
a = 0 versus a = s is one of choosing between reserve prices for a second-price auction.
At the same time, a type-L seller strictly prefers posting a = 0 to a = s: This follows
from the argument that we made to rule out pooling-on-high equilibria. Finally, of
course, if all type-L sellers post a = 0 and all type-H sellers post a = s; then buyer
beliefs are consistent, and the equilibrium exists. There is, however, the question of
whether either seller type would want to deviate to some asking price other than 0 or s:
As discussed above when we ruled out the existence of a pooling-on-low equilibrium, a
type-L seller strictly prefers a = 0 to any a0 > 0 if posting a0 would lead buyers to place
any positive probability on the possibility that the deviant might be type H. Further,
even if buyers believe that a deviation to a0 signals type L with probability one, type-
L sellers are no better o¤ posting a0 than posting zero. In short, type-L sellers have
no incentive to deviate from the conjectured equilibrium conguration. Next, consider
a type-H seller. If a type-H seller deviates to a0 > s and buyers view a0 > s as a
probability-one signal that the deviant is type H, then the type-H seller neither gains
nor loses by the deviation. Finally, it cannot be in the interest of a type-H seller to
deviate to a0 2 (0; s). The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that it would be in
the interest of a type-H seller to deviate to a0 if buyers viewed the deviant as type H
with probability  > 0. However, if  > 0; it is strictly not in the interest of a type-L
seller to post a0; so, by the D1 renement, buyers should believe the deviant is type H
with probability 1: But if  = 1, then Lemma 1 shows that it is not in the interest of a
type-H seller to post a0: Similarly, suppose it would be in the interest of a type-H seller
to deviate to a0 if  = 0: Then buyers must view the deviant as type H with positive
probability; i.e., the hypothesized buyer beliefs would be inconsistent.
In addition to the separating equilibrium just described, there are other payo¤-
equivalent separating equilibria. In particular, a situation in which all type-L sellers
post a = 0, while type-H sellers post any distribution of asking prices over a  s, and
buyers believe a = 0 signals type L and that asking prices of s or more signal type H,
is also a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. There are also payo¤-equivalent equilibria in
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which type-L sellers post a distribution of low asking prices while type-H sellers post a
distribution of high asking prices with consistent buyer beliefs.
Without restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, there may also exist payo¤-inferior
separating equilibria. Suppose, for example, that all type-L sellers post a = 0 while all
type-H sellers post a = s  ": Suppose further that if a seller were to post a = s; buyers
would believe this signaled type L with probability one. Then it would not be in the
interest of a type-H seller to deviate to a = s: This conguration entails a loss of surplus
relative to the equilibrium in which all type-L sellers post a = 0 and all type-H sellers
post a = s since when type-H sellers post an asking price below s; houses are sometimes
transferred from a type-H seller to a buyer even though the buyer values the house less
than the seller does.
We rule out these unnaturalseparating equilibria by appealing to the same rene-
ment that we used to show the nonexistence of pooling-on-low equilibria. Specically,
given that buyers believe that a deviation to a = s signals type H with probability one,
it is in the interest of type-H sellers to make that deviation. This argument rules out any
candidate equilibrium in which type-H sellers are assumed to post asking prices below
their reservation value.
Summarizing, we have the following results on separating equilibrium:
Proposition 3 Under the D1 renement, there exists a separating equilibrium in which
all type-L sellers post a = 0, all type-H sellers post a = s; and in which buyers believe
that a = 0 signals type L with probability 1 while a = s signals type H with probability
1. There also exist payo¤-equivalent separating equilibria in which type-L sellers post
a distribution of low asking prices, type-H sellers post a distribution of asking prices
over a  s; and in which buyers believe that low (high) asking prices signal type L (H)
with probability one. Finally, there exist no payo¤-inferior separating equilibria in which
type-H sellers post asking prices below s:
4.2.1 Buyer Optimality Condition
A continuum of payo¤-equivalent separating equilibria exist for each parameter congu-
ration, fq; s; g: Relative to the homogeneous-seller version of the model, an additional
issue to consider is the question of how buyers allocate themselves across the two seller
types. Suppose buyers visit type-H sellers with probability r and type-L sellers with
probability 1 r: For given q and ; this implies an expected arrival rate of L = (1  r)
1  q
to type-L sellers and of H =
r
q
to type-H sellers. Given r; the expected payo¤ for a
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buyer who visits a type-L seller is
VL(r) =
Z 1
0
(1  F (x))e L(1 F (x))dx;
while the expected payo¤ for a buyer who visits a type-H seller is
VH(r) =
Z 1
s
(1  F (x))e H(1 F (x))dx:
This gives the following Buyer Optimality Condition
VL(r)  VH(r) with equality if r > 0: (8)
Note that (i) VL(r) is increasing in r; (ii) VH(r) is decreasing in r;22 and (iii) VL(q) 
VH(q): If VL(0)  VH(0); then r = 0: If VL(0) < VH(0); then there is a unique r 2 (0; q]
that satises the Buyer Optimality Condition.
To get a sense for the Buyer Optimality Condition, we consider a simple example.
Suppose X follows a standard uniform distribution, so F (x) = x for 0  x  1: Then
VL(r) =
1  e L   Le L
2L
VH(r) =
1  e H(1 s)   H(1  s)e H(1 s)
2H
:
The shaded areas of Figures 1 and 2 show the set of (s; ) combinations for which r > 0
for two di¤erent values of q: The pattern shown in these gures is intuitive. When s
is not too high, buyers do not lose much by visiting a type-H seller, and when  is not
too low, the market is relatively tight so buyers have an incentive to visit the type-H
sellers. As q increases, there are relatively fewer type-L sellers to visit so buyers have
more incentive to visit the type-H sellers. In the non-shaded areas in Figures 1 and
2, where s is relatively high and/or  is relatively low, separating equilibria exist with
r = 0; i.e., buyers do not visit the type-H sellers.
22Unless, of course, s = 1; in which case VH(r) = 0 for all r:
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Figure 1: (s; ) combinations for which r > 0 for q = 0:2
22
Figure 2: (s; ) combinations for which r > 0 for q = 0:8
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4.2.2 Equilibrium with Free Entry
Of course, it is odd to consider separating equilibria in which buyers never visit type-H
sellers. This makes it natural to consider the equilibrium entry of these sellers. Suppose
there is an entry cost of A, where A could be interpreted, for example, as an advertising
cost. Type-L sellers enter so long as
L
Z 1
0
v(x)e L(1 F (x))f(x)dx  A:
Assume this free-entry condition holds as a strict inequality, so that all motivated sellers
enter the market. If there were some type-L sellers who chose not to enter, then it
could not be in the interest of any type-H sellers to enter, and we would be back in the
homogeneous-seller case. We let B be the measure of buyers in the market and L be
the measure of type-L sellers, and we dene  = B=L; the exogenous ratio of buyers to
type-L sellers. The interesting entry question therefore has to do with type-H sellers,
and in equilibrium, the free-entry condition for this type is
s+ H
Z 1
s
(v(x)  s)e H(1 F (x))f(x)dx  A+ s with equality if H > 0: (9)
Once we impose this free-entry condition for type-H sellers, the model is described by
two parameters,  and s: Again, it is useful to consider the standard uniform example.
Figure 3 shows the set of (; s) combinations that are consistent with entry by type-H
sellers. All else equal, the lower is s; i.e., the smaller is the di¤erence in motivation
between type-L and type-H sellers, the more incentive there is for type-H sellers to incur
the advertising cost and enter the market. Similarly, the higher is ; the more incentive
there is for entry by relaxed sellers since as  rises, the number of visiting buyers that a
seller can expect increases.
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Figure 3: (s; ) combinations with entry of type-H sellers
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In the heterogeneous-seller version of the model, there are three dimensions of e¢ -
ciency to consider. First, as in the homogeneous-seller version of the model, once buyers
are matched to sellers, the selling mechanism that we consider is e¢ cient. In separating
equilibrium, the house is sold if and only if the highest buyer valuation exceeds the
sellers reservation value, and if the house is sold, it goes to the buyer with the highest
valuation. Second, and this is specic to the heterogeneous-seller version of the model
there is the question of whether buyers allocate themselves e¢ ciently across the two
seller types. Finally, there is the question of whether the equilibrium levels of seller
entry are the same as the levels that a social planner would choose.
To prove that the equilibrium queue lengths and the level of seller entry are con-
strained e¢ cient, note that separating equilibria in which type-H sellers post asking
prices of s or more while type-L sellers distinguish themselves by posting lower asking
prices are payo¤ equivalent to an equilibrium in which the two seller types post second-
price auctions with reserve prices of s and 0; respectively. The results of Albrecht,
Gautier, and Vroman (2014) then imply that the equilibrium queue lengths and entry
are constrained e¢ cient. That is, free-entry equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient in the
heterogeneous-seller model.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we construct a directed search model of the housing market. The mecha-
nism that we analyze captures important aspects of the way houses are bought and sold
in the United States. Sellers post asking prices, and buyers direct their search based on
these prices. A buyer can make a countero¤er or o¤er to pay the asking price. If no buy-
ers o¤er to pay the asking price, the seller can accept or reject the best countero¤er (if
any) received. If at least one buyer o¤ers to pay the asking price, the seller is committed
to sell the house at a price equal to the highest bid that follows from the competition
among those buyers.
In the homogeneous-seller version of this model, that is, when we assume that all
sellers have the same reservation value, s; we show that any distribution of asking prices
over a  s constitutes an equilibrium. Furthermore, consistent with the empirical evi-
dence, our model implies that houses sometimes sell below, sometimes at, and sometimes
above the asking price. Thus, our model generates equilibrium price dispersion for iden-
tical houses sold by identical sellers in terms of both asking prices and nal sales prices.
This free-entry equilibrium is also constrained e¢ cient.
In the heterogeneous-seller version of the model under the D1 renement on buyers
beliefs, only separating equilibria exist. In separating equilibrium, the sellers with the
26
low (high) reservation value identify themselves by posting low (high) asking prices.
That is, the asking price also plays a signaling role by allocating buyers across the two
seller types. Equilibrium is again constrained e¢ cient. The fraction of buyers who
visit high-type sellers and the level of market tightness equal the values that a social
planner would choose. Of course, we are not arguing that there are no ine¢ ciencies in
the housing market, but rather that the pricing mechanism and the fact that buyers do
not directly observe seller types is not a source of ine¢ ciency.
Our paper contributes both to the growing literature that uses equilibrium search
theory to model the housing market and to the directed search literature. Our contri-
bution to the housing literature is to build a directed search model that captures the
main features of the house-selling process in the United States. We explain the role of
the asking price and its relationship to the sales price. Our contribution to the directed
search literature is to analyze a model in which there is only limited commitment and
the posted price also plays a signaling role.
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